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We consider situations where a society allocates a finite units of an indivisible good
among agents, and each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, imagine
that a government allocates a fixed number of licences to private firms, or imagine that
a government distributes equally divided lands to households. We show that the Vickrey
allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity and
individual rationality.
1. Introduction
We consider situations where a society allocates a finite units of an indivisible good
among agents, and each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, imagine
that a government allocates a fixed number of licences to private firms, or imagine that a
government distributes equally divided lands to households.1 A number of allocation rules,
including several forms of auction, are proposed for various social purposes such as effi-
ciency, revenue maximization, etc. For the purpose of efficiency, one rule has a remarkable
feature. It is “the Vickrey allocation rule”. First, the Vickrey allocation rule allocates the
goods to agents evaluating the good highest. (“Efficiency”) Second, the Vickrey allocation
rule extracts true information on agents’ valuations from them. (“Strategy-Proofness”)
Thirdly, the Vickrey allocation rule induces agents’ voluntary participation. (“Individual
Rationality”) And most importantly, as proved by Holmstrom (1979), the Vickrey allo-
cation rule is the unique rule satisfying these three properties. It is well known that the
Vickrey allocation rule also satisfies a property of impartiality called “anonymity”. In
this paper, we characterize the Vickrey allocation rule by focusing on anonymity instead
of efficiency. Our characterization emphasizes that the Vickrey allocation rule also has a
remarkable feature for the purpose of impartiality.
An allocation rule is generally formulated as a function from the set of agents’ valua-
tions on the good to the feasible set. An allocation rule is efficient if it allocates the goods
to agents evaluating the good highest. Given an allocation rule, since agents’ private val-
uations are not known to the others, there may be incentives for agents to misrepresent
their values in order to manipulate the final outcomes to their favor. As a result, the
actual outcomes may not constitute a socially desirable allocation relative to agents’ true
valuations. Therefore, allocation rules need to be immune to such strategic misrepresen-
tation in order to securely attain a desirable allocation for agents’ true valuations. If an
allocation rule is immune to such strategic behavior, that is, if it is a dominant strat-
egy for each agent to announce his true valuations, then the allocation rule is said to be
strategy-proof. A condition of individual rationality is also imposed on allocation rules
to induce agents’ voluntary participation; it says that an allocation rule never assigns an
allocation which makes some agent worse off than he would be if he receives no good and
pays nothing. It is important to know what allocation rules satisfy efficiency, strategy-
proofness, and individual rationality. The Vickrey allocation rule is the rule such that
agents with m highest valuations of the goods receive the goods and pay the (m+ 1)-th
valuation, and other agents pay nothing. Holmstrom (1979)2 establishes that the Vickrey
allocation rule is the unique rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual
rationality. This result emphasizes the distinguished importance of the Vickrey allocation
rule for the purpose of efficiency.
However, society members are often more sensitive to impartiality than efficiency.
In such environments, governments need to make more of impartiality than efficiency.
Anonymity is a condition of impartiality in the sense that it requires allocation rules to
treat agents equally from the viewpoint of agents who are ignorant of their own values
1The vehicle ownership licence in Singapore is also an example, where the ownership licences are
distributed among residents through auction.
2Similar characterizations of Groves rules in public good models are previously established by Green
and Laffont (1977), and Walker (1978). However, the characterizations of the these two articles cannot be
applied to allocation rules of indivisible goods since they assume that the class of admissible preferences
include preferences which are not admissible in the model of indivisible goods allocation.
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or identities. An allocation rule is anonymous if when the valuations of two agents are
switched, their net gain under the rule are also switched. In this article, we establish that
the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity, and
individual rationality. (Theorem 2)
There is also literature analyzing the fairness of the Vickrey allocation rule. Most
of such literature focus on “envy-freeness.” An allocation rule is envy-free if no agent
prefers another agent’s allocation to his own. Svensson (1983) shows that envy-freeness
of indivisible goods allocation implies efficiency. This result, together with Holmstrom’s
(1979), implies that the Vickrey allocation rule is also the unique rule satisfying strategy-
proofness, envy-freeness, and individual rationality. Many authors such as Papai (2003),
Ohseto (2005), Sakai (2005), etc., apply Svensson’s (1983) result to characterize the Vick-
rey allocation rule.
In this article, we do not impose envy-freeness on allocation rules, and so we cannot
apply Svensson’s (1983) result. Instead, we show that strategy-proofness, anonymity, and
individual rationality together imply efficiency (Proposition). This result, together with
Holmstrom’s (1979), implies our characterization of the Vickrey allocation rule (Theorem
2). Focusing on anonymity, our characterization emphasizes that the Vickrey alloca-
tion rule also has a remarkable feature for the purpose of impartiality, and complements
Holmstrom’s (1979).
Section 2 sets up the model, defines basic notions, and states main results. Section 3
provides the proof of Proposition.
Section 2 Model and Main Result
The set of agents is N = {1, . . . , N}. There are m units of an indivisible good. An
item allocation is a n−tuple x = (x1, . . . , xn) such that
P
xi = m, where for each i ∈ N,
xi is the units of the good agent i receives.3 We assume that xi = 0 or xi = 1 for each
i ∈ N , that is, agents can receive at most one unit of the good. Denote the set of item
allocations by X, that is, X = {x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n :
P
xi = m}. For each i ∈ N ,
denote agent i’s payment by pi ∈ R+. We assume that payments are nonnegative. The
feasible set is Z = X×Rn+. An allocation is an element z = (x, p) = (x1, . . . , xn; p1, . . . , pn)
of Z, and agent i’s allocation is zi = (xi, pi).
Each agent i ∈ N has a quasi-linear utility function ui : {0, 1} × R+ → R, that is,
there is a value vi ∈ R+ such that for all (xi, pi) ∈ {0, 1} × R+, ui(xi, pi) = vi · xi − pi.
Denote the set of agent i’s such values by Vi.
Let V = V1 × · · · × Vn. A value profile is an element v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V . Given
v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V , N 0 ⊆ N , and i ∈ N , vN 0 denotes (vj)j∈N 0 and v−i denotes
(vj)j∈N\{i}. Given v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V and bvi ∈ Vi, (bvi, v−i) denotes the value profile
(v1, . . . , vi−1,bvi, vi+1, . . . , vn). Similarly, given v ∈ V , N 0 ⊆ N , and bvN 0 ∈ VN 0 ≡Qi∈N 0 Vi,
(bvN 0 , v−N 0) denotes the value profile generated from v by replacing the values of the set
N 0 of agents by bvN 0.
An allocation rule is a function f from V to Z. Given an allocation rule f and a
value profile v ∈ V , we denote f(v) = (x(v), p(v)), where x(v) = (x1(v), . . . , xn(v)) and
p(v) = (p1(v), . . . , pn(v)) respectively denote the outcome item allocation and payments
of f for v, and we also denote fi(v) = (xi(v), pi(v)).
We introduce several conditions of allocation rules. The first one is “efficiency”. It
says that allocation rules maximize the total value.
3We assume that all the units of the good are allocated to agents.
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Definition: An allocation rule f is efficient if for all v ∈ V , x(v) ∈ argmax{Pi∈N vi ·
xi : x ∈ X}.
Next, we introduce impartiality conditions. “Equal treatment of equals” says that
allocation rules give equal utility levels to agents with the same value. “Anonymity” says
that when the valuations of two agents are switched, their utility levels are also switched.
This condition requires rules to treat agents equally from the viewpoints of agents who
are ignorant of their own values or identities.
Definition: An allocation rule f equally treats equals if for all v ∈ V ,
vi = vj =⇒ ui(fi(v)) = uj(fj(v)).
Definition: An allocation rule f is anonymous if for all v ∈ V , all i ∈ N , all j ∈ N ,
all bvi ∈ Vi, and all bvj ∈ Vj,
[bvi = vj&bvj = vi] =⇒ [bui(fi(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j})) = uj(fj(v))&buj(fj(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j})) = ui(fi(v))],
where bui(xi, pi) = bvi · xi − pi and buj(xj, pj) = bvj · xj − pj.
Remark: Anonymity implies equal treatment of equals.4
“Envy-freeness” says that no agent prefers another agent’s allocation to his own. In
contrast to anonymity, this condition compares agents’ welfare from the viewpoints of
agents whose identifies and values are specified.
Definition: An allocation rule f is envy-free if for all v ∈ V , all i ∈ N and all j ∈ N ,
ui(fi(v)) ≥ ui(fj(v)).
“Strategy-proofness” is one of strongest incentive compatibility conditions. It says
that to announce one’s true value is a dominant strategy.
Definition: An allocation rule f is strategy-proof if for all v ∈ V , all i ∈ N , and allbvi ∈ Vi, ui(fi(v)) ≥ ui(fi(bvi, v−i)).
“Individual rationality” induces agents to participate voluntarily by guaranteeing that
an allocation rule never assigns the outcome that makes some agent worse off than his
status quo ui(0, 0) = 0.
Definition: An allocation rule f is individually rational if for all v ∈ V and all
i ∈ N , ui(fi(v)) ≥ 0.
Given a value profile v ∈ V , we rank agents’ values, and denote the agent with the
first highest value by i(v, 1), the agent with the second highest value by i(v, 2), and so
on. Ties are broken arbitrarily. Under the Vickrey allocation rule defined below, agents
with m highest values receive the goods and pay the (m+ 1)−th highest value, vi(v,m+1),
and other agents pay nothing.
Definition: A Vickrey allocation rule is an allocation rule f∗ = (x∗(·), p∗(·)) such
that
(1) ∀v ∈ V,∀i ∈ N,x∗i (v) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if vi > vi(v,m)
1 if i = i(v,m), and
0 otherwise
and (2) ∀i ∈ N, p∗i (v) =
(
vi(v,m+1) if x∗i (v)= 1, and
0 otherwise
4This implication is intensively employed in the proof of Proposition below.
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To be precise, the Vickrey allocation rule is not unique, since the way to break tie in
ranking agents’ values is not unique. In other words, there are as many Vickrey allocation
rules as the ways to break ties. However, in the view of Remark below, we treat Vickrey
allocation rules as if they were unique.
Remark: Let f∗ and bf∗ be Vickrey allocation rules. Then
(i)
P
i∈N x
∗i
t (u) =
P
i∈N bx∗it (u) for any u ∈ U .
(ii) ui(f∗i(u)) = ui( bf∗i(u)) for any u ∈ U and any i ∈ N .
Theorem 1 below says that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique rule satisfying
strategy-proofness, efficiency, and individual rationality.
Theorem 1 (Holmstrom, 1979): An allocation rule satisfies strategy-proofness,
efficiency, and individual rationality if and only if it is the Vickrey allocation rule.
Proposition below says that the condition of anonymity, together with strategy-proofness
and individual rationality, implies efficiency. We prove Proposition in Section 3.
Proposition: If an allocation rule satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity and indi-
vidual rationality, it also satisfies efficiency.
As Svensson (1983) shows, envy-freeness alone implies efficiency. However, as Example
1 illustrates, anonymity alone does not imply efficiency.
Example 1: Let m = 1 and n = 2. Let f be the allocation rule such that if v1 ≤ v2,
f(v) = (1, 0; v2, 0), and if v1 > v2, f(v) = (0, 1; 0, v1). Then, f is anonymous, but not
efficient. f also violates strategy-proofness, and individual rationality.
It is well known that the Vickrey allocation rule satisfies the three axioms of strategy-
proofness, anonymity and individual rationality. Thus, Theorem 1 and Proposition to-
gether imply Theorem 2 below. Theorem 2 says that the Vickrey allocation rule is the
unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity, and individual rationality.
Theorem 2: An allocation rule satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity and individual
rationality if and only if it is the Vickrey allocation rule.
The three examples below illustrate that the three axioms in the Theorem 2 are all
indispensable.
Example 2: Let m = 1 and n = 2. Let f be the allocation rule such that if v1 ≥ 1,
f(v) = (1, 0; 1, 0), and if v1 < 1, f(v) = (0, 1; 0, 0). Then, f satisfies strategy-proofness,
and individual rationality, but not anonymity. f is not the Vickrey allocation rule.
Example 3: Let m = 1 and n = 2. Let f be the allocation rule such that if v1 ≥ v2,
f(v) = (1, 0; v1, 0), and if v1 < v2, f(v) = (0, 1; 0, v2). Then, f satisfies anonymity, and
individual rationality, but not strategy-proofness. f is not the Vickrey allocation rule.
Example 4: Let m = 1 and n = 2. Let f be the allocation rule such that if v1 ≥ v2,
f(v) = (1, 0; 2v2, v1), and if v1 < v2, f(v) = (0, 1; v2, 2v1). Then, f satisfies strategy-
proofness, and anonymity, but not individual rationality. f is not the Vickrey allocation
rule.
Section 3 Proofs
We devote this section to the proof of Proposition.
3.1 Lemmas
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In this subsection, we state and prove several lemmas as preliminary results for the
proof of Proposition.
Lemma 1: Let f be an individually rational allocation rule. For all v ∈ V and all
i ∈ N , if xi(v) = 0, then pi(v) = 0 and ui(fi(v)) = 0.
Lemma 1 directly follows from individual rationality. Thus, we omit the proof of
Lemma 1.
Lemma 2: Let f be a strategy-proof allocation rule. For all v ∈ V , all i ∈ N , and allbvi ∈ Vi, if xi(bvi, v−i) = xi(v), pi(bvi, v−i) = pi(v).
Proof: Let v ∈ V , i ∈ N , and bvi ∈ Vi be such that xi(bvi, v−i) = xi(v). If pi(bvi, v−i) >
pi(v), bui(fi(v)) < bui(fi(bvi, v−i)), and if pi(bvi, v−i) < pi(v), ui(fi(v)) < ui(fi(bvi, v−i)). Both
cases contradict strategy-proofness. Thus pi(bvi, v−i) = pi(v). ¤
Lemma 3: Let f be a strategy-proof and individually rational allocation rule. For
all v ∈ V , all i ∈ N , and all bvi ∈ Vi, if xi(v) = 1 and bvi > vi, then xi(bvi, v−i) = 1, and
pi(bvi, v−i) = pi(v).
Proof: Let v ∈ V , i ∈ N , and bvi ∈ Vi be such that xi(v) = 1 and bvi > vi.
Suppose that xi(bvi, v−i) = 0. Then by Lemma 1, bui(fi(bvi, v−i)) = 0. By individual
rationality, pi(v) ≤ vi < bvi. Thus, bui(fi(v)) = bvi − pi(v) > 0 = bui(fi(bvi, v−i)). This is a
contradiction to strategy-proofness. Therefore, xi(bvi, v−i) = 1 = xi(v), and by Lemma 2,
pi(bvi, v−i) = pi(v). ¤
Lemma 4: Let f be a strategy-proof and individually rational allocation rule. For
all v ∈ V , all i ∈ N , and all bvi ∈ Vi, if xi(v) = 0 and bvi < vi, then xi(bvi, v−i) = 0 and
pi(bvi, v−i) = 0.
Proof: Let v ∈ V , i ∈ N , and bvi ∈ Vi be such that xi(v) = 0 and bvi < vi.
Suppose that xi(bvi, v−i) = 1. By Lemma 1, ui(fi(v)) = 0. By individually rationality,
pi(bvi, v−i) ≤ bvi < vi. Thus, ui(fi(bvi, v−i)) = vi − pi(bvi, v−i) > 0 = ui(fi(v)). This
is a contradiction to strategy-proofness. Therefore, xi(bvi, v−i) = 0, and by Lemma 1,
pi(bvi, v−i) = 0. ¤
Lemma 5: Let f be a strategy-proof, anonymous and individually rational allocation
rule. Let v ∈ V , i ∈ N , bvi ∈ Vi, v0 > 0 and N 0 ⊆ N be such that xi(v) = 1, vi < v0 = bvi,
and vj = v0 for all j ∈ N 0. Then xi(bvi, v−i) = xj(bvi, v−i) = 1 for all j ∈ N 0.
Proof: By Lemma 3, xi(bvi, v−i) = 1 and pi(bvi, v−i) = pi(v) ≤ vi < v0. Thus, since
vj = v0 = bvi for all j ∈ N 0, it follows from anonymity that uj(bvi, v−i) = bui(bvi, v−i) ≥bvi − vi > 0 for all j ∈ N 0. Therefore, xj(bvi, v−i) = 1 for all j ∈ N 0. ¤
Lemma 6: Let f be a strategy-proof, anonymous and individually rational allocation
rule. Let v ∈ V , i ∈ N , bvi ∈ Vi, v0 ≥ 0 and N 0 ⊆ N be such that xi(v) = 0, vi > v0 = bvi,
and vj = v0 for all j ∈ N 0. Then xi(bvi, v−i) = xj(bvi, v−i) = 0 for all j ∈ N 0.
Proof: By Lemma 1 and xi(v) = 0, ui(v) = 0. By Lemma 4, xi(v) = 0 and bvi < v,
we have xi(bvi, v−i) = 0, and so by Lemma 1, bui(bvi, v−i) = 0. Thus, since vj = v0 = bvi
for all j ∈ N 0, it follows from anonymity that uj(bvi, v−i) = bui(bvi, v−i) = 0 for all j ∈ N 0.
Therefore, for all j ∈ N 0, if xj(bvi, v−i) = 1, pj(bvi, v−i) = v0.
Since xi(bvi, v−i) = 0, suppose that there is j ∈ N 0 such that xj(bvi, v−i) = 1. Let bvj = vi.
Then, since vi > v0 = vj, Lemma 3 implies that xj(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j}) = 1, pj(bvi, bvj, v−{i,j}) =
pj(bvi, v−i) = v0 < vi = bvj, and buj(fj(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j})) = bvj − v0 > 0. Since ui(fi(v)) = 0,
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bvi = v0 = vj, and bvj = vi, this is a contradiction to anonymity. Hence, for all, j ∈ N 0,
xj(bvi, v−i) = 0. ¤
3.2 Proof of Proposition
In this subsection, we prove Proposition. Let f be an allocation rule satisfying
strategy-proofness, anonymity and individual rationality. Let v ∈ V . We show that
f(v) is efficient. Without loss of generality, assume v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vm = · · · = vn0 >
vn0+1 ≥ vn0+2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn.5
Case 1: n0 = n. Note that f(v) is efficient if for all i ∈ N , vi > vm implies xi(v) = 1.
Suppose that there is i ∈ N such that vi > vm and xi(v) = 0. By vi > vm, i < m. Let bvi =
vm. Then, by Lemma 6, xi(bvi, v−i) = xm(bvi, v−i) = xm+1(bvi, v−i) = · · · = xn(bvi, v−i) = 0.
Thus, the number of agents who receive the good at the value profile (bvi, v−i) is less than
or equal to m− 1. Since there are m units of the good, this is a contradiction. Thus f(v)
is efficient.
Case 2: n0 < n. Note that f(v) is efficient if (A) for all i ∈ N , vi > vm implies
xi(v) = 1, and (B) for all i ∈ N , xi(v) = 1 implies i ≤ n0.
The basic idea to prove Condition (A) is similar to that of Case 1, but it involves a
more complicate procedure. If there is an agent i such that vi > vm and xi(v) = 0, then
we lower his value to bvi = vm and obtain xi(bvi, v−i) = xm(bvi, v−i) = xm+1(bvi, v−i) =
· · · = xn0(bvi, v−i) = 0 by Lemma 6. However, this is not yet a contradiction. For
there may be an agent j such that vj < vm, and xj(bvi, v−i) = 1. Note that vi > vm
implies i < m, and that vj < vm implies j > n0. Here we raise the value of agent
j to bvj = vm, and obtain xj(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j}) = xi(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j}) = xm(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j}) =
xm+1(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j}) = · · · = xn0(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j}) = 1 by Lemma 5. Since there are only
m units of the goods, it follows that there is agent i0 < m such that xi0(bvi, bvj, v−{i,j}) = 0.
i0 < m implies vi0 ≥ vm. If vi0 = vm, Lemma 5 implies xi0(bvi, bvj, v−{i,j}) = 1, contra-
dicting to xi0(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j}) = 0. Thus, vi0 > vm. Then, we lower i0’s value to bvi0 = vm
again, and obtain xi0(bvi, bvi0 ,bvj, v−{i,i0,j}) = xi(bvi,bvi0 , bvj, v−{i,i0,j}) = xj(bvi, bvi0 ,bvj, v−{i,i0,j}) =
xm(bvi,bvi0 , bvj, v−{i,i0,j}) = xm+1(bvi,bvi0 ,bvj, v−{i,i0,j}) = · · · = xn0(bvi,bvi0 ,bvj, v−{i,i0,j}) = 0 by
Lemma 6. We repeat this procedure until we get a contradiction. To prove Condition
(B), we also repeat a similar procedure. During the repetitions, Claim below holds.
Claim: Let l ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}, N1 ⊂ N , N2 ⊂ N , N3 ⊂ N , N4 ⊂ N , bvN1 ∈ VN1 ,
and bvN4 ∈ VN4 be such that
(1) N1 ∪N2 = {1, . . . ,m− 1} and N1 ∩N2 = ∅,
(2) #N1 = l, and for all j ∈ N1, bvj = vm,
(3) N3 = {m, . . . , n0}
(4) N4 ⊆ N\{1, . . . , n0}, #N4 = l, and for all j ∈ N4, bvj = vm.
We consider the value profile (bvN1 , vN2, vN3,bvN4, vN\(N1∪N2∪N3∪N4)), the value profile
generated from v by lowering the values of N1 to vm and raising those of N4 to vm.6
If there is i ∈ N2 such that vi > vm and xi(bvN1, vN2, vN3 ,bvN4 , vN\(N1∪N2∪N3∪N4)) = 0,
and if we lower i’s value to bvi = vm, then
(i) for all j ∈ N1 ∪N3 ∪N4 ∪ {i},
xj(bvN1 ,bvi, vN2\{i}, vN3,bvN4, vN\(N1∪N2∪N3∪N4)) = 0,
5n0 may eqaul to m or n. In case of n0 = m, v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vm > vm+1 ≥ vm+2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn. In case
of n0 = n, v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vm = vm+1 = · · · = vn.
6In case of N1 = {1, . . . , l}, N2 = {l + 1, . . . ,m − 1}, and N4 = {n0 + 1, . . . , n0 + l},
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and (ii) there is j ∈ N\(N1 ∪ N2 ∪ N3 ∪ N4) such that for bvj = vm, and for all k ∈
N1 ∪N3 ∪N4 ∪ {i, j},
xk(bvN1, bvi, vN2\{i}, vN3 ,bvN4,bvj, vN\(N1∪N2∪N3∪N4∪{j})) = 1.
If there is i ∈ N\(N1∪N2∪N3∪N4) such that xi(bvN1 , vN2 , vN3,bvN4, vN\(N1∪N2∪N3∪N4)) =
1, and if we raise agent i’s value to bvi = vm, then
(iii) for all j ∈ N1 ∪N3 ∪N4 ∪ {i},
xj(bvN1 , vN2, vN3, bvN4 ,bvi, vN\(N1∪N2∪N3∪N4∪{i})) = 1,
and (iv) there is j ∈ N2 such that for bvj = vm, and for all k ∈ N1 ∪N3 ∪N4 ∪ {i, j},
xk(bvN1, bvj, vN2\{j}, vN3,bvN4, bvi, vN\(N1∪N2∪N3∪N4∪{i})) = 0.
Proof of Claim: Assume that there is i ∈ N2 such that vi > vm and
xi(bvN1 , vN2, vN3, bvN4 , vN\(N1∪N2∪N3∪N4)) = 0, and bvi = vm. Then, Conclusion (i) follows
from Lemma 6. Note that Conclusion (i) implies that the number of agents inN1∪N2∪N3∪
N4 who receive the good at the value profile (bvN1, bvi, vN2\{i}, vN3 ,bvN4, vN\(N1∪N2∪N3∪N4)) is
less than or equal to (m−1)− l−1 = m− l−2. Thus, since there are m units of the good,
there is j ∈ N\(N1∪N2∪N3∪N4) such that xj(bvN1 ,bvi, vN2\{i}, vN3,bvN4, vN\(N1∪N2∪N3∪N4)) =
1. Since j ∈ N\(N1 ∪N2 ∪N3 ∪N4) implies vj < vm, Lemma 5 implies Conclusion (ii).
Similarly, Conclusion (iii) follows from Lemma 5, and Conclusion (iv) follows from
Conclusion (iii) and Lemma 6. ¤
Proof of Condition (A): Suppose that there is i ∈ N such that vi > vm and
xi(v) = 0. We derive a contradiction. Note that vi > vm implies that m ≥ 2 and i < m.
Case 2-A-1: m − 1 ≥ n − n0. By applying Conclusion (ii) of Claim, we can pick
up an agent j from {n0 + 1, . . . , n}, set bvi = bvj = vm, and have xk(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j}) =
xi(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j}) = xj(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j}) = 1 for all k ∈ {m, . . . , n0}. Since there are only m
units of the good, there is i0 ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}\{i} such that xi0(bvi, bvj, v−{i,j}) = 0. By
i0 ≤ m − 1, vi0 ≥ vm. If vi0 = vm, Lemma 5 implies xi0(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j}) = 1, contradicting
to xi0(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j}) = 0. Thus, vi0 > vm and we can apply Conclusion (ii) of Claim
again. Apply Conclusion (ii) of Claim (n − n0) times in this way. As a result, we have:
xk(bvN1 ,bvN4, vN\(N1∪N4)) = 1 for all k ∈ N1 ∪ N3 ∪ N4, where N1 ⊆ {1, . . . ,m − 1},
#N1 = n − n0, N3 = {m, . . . , n0}, N4 = {n0 + 1, . . . , n}, bvN1 = (vm, . . . , vm), and bvN4 =
(vm, . . . , vm).7 If m − 1 = n − n0, then N1 ∪ N3 ∪ N4 = N, and so we have already a
(bvN1 , vN2 , vN3 , bvN4 , vN\(N1∪N2∪N3∪N4)) is the value profile such that
( bv1, . . . , bvl| {z }
N1
, vl+1, . . . , vm−1| {z },
N2
vm, . . . , vn0| {z },
N3
bvn0+1, . . . , bvn0+l| {z },
N4
vn0+l+1, . . . , vn)
= (vm, . . . , vm| {z }
N1
, vl+1, . . . , vm−1| {z },
N2
vm, . . . , vm| {z }
N3
, vm, . . . , vm| {z }
N4
, vn0+l+1, . . . , vn).
7In case of N1 = {1, . . . , n− n0}, (bvN1 , bvN4 , vN\(N1∪N4)) is the value profile such that
( bv1, . . . , bvn−n0| {z }
N1
, vn−n0+1, . . . , vm−1, vm, . . . , vn0| {z },
N3
bvn0+1, . . . , bvn| {z }
N4
)
= (vm, . . . , vm| {z }
N1
, vn−n0+1, . . . , vm−1, vm, . . . , vm| {z }
N3
, vm, . . . , vm| {z }
N4
).
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contradiction. Thus, m − 1 > n − n0. Since n > n0 and there are only m units of the
good, there is k ∈ N\(N1 ∪N3 ∪N4) such that xk(bvN1, bvN4 , vN\(N1∪N4)) = 0. We can show
vk > vm similarly to the case of i0. Let bvk = vm. Then, by Conclusion (i) of Claim, for all
h ∈ N1 ∪ N3 ∪ N4, xh(bvN1,bvN4, bvk, vN\(N1∪N4∪{k})) = xk(bvN1,bvN4, bvk, vN\(N1∪N4∪{k})) = 0.
The number of agents who receive the good at the value profile (bvN1 ,bvN4 ,bvk, vN\(N1∪N4∪{k}))
is less than or equal to n− [(n− n0) + 1 + (n0 −m+ 1) + (n− n0)] = (m− 2)− (n− n0).
By n > n0, this is a contradiction.
Case 2-A-2: m−1 < n−n0. Similarly to Case 2-A-1, apply Conclusion (ii) of Claim
(m− 1) times. As a result, we have: xk(bvN1,bvN4, vN\(N1∪N4)) = 1 for all k ∈ N1∪N3∪N4,
where N1 = {1, . . . ,m − 1}, N3 = {m, . . . , n0}, N4 ⊆ {n0 + 1, . . . , n}, #N4 = m − 1,bvN1 = (vm, . . . , vm), and bvN4 = (vm, . . . , vm).8 Since there are only m units of the good
and m ≥ 2, this is a contradiction.
Since we get a contradiction whether m − 1 ≥ n − n0 or m − 1 < n − n0, Condition
(A) holds.
Proof of Condition (B): Suppose that there is i ∈ N such that xi(v) = 1 and
i ∈ {n0 + 1, . . . , n}. We derive a contradiction. By i > n0, vi < vm. If m = 1, then by
applying Conclusion (i) of Claim, we derive a contradiction. For Conclusion (i) of Claim
implies that for all j ∈ {m, . . . , n0}∪ {i}, xj(bvi, v−i) = 1, where bvi = vm. Thus, let m ≥ 2
hereafter.
Case 2-B-1: m − 1 ≥ n − n0. By applying Conclusion (iv) of Claim, we can pick
up an agent j from {1, . . . ,m − 1}, set bvi = bvj = vm, and have xk(bvi, bvj, v−{i,j}) =
xi(bvi,bvj, v−{i,j}) = xj(bvi, bvj, v−{i,j}) = 0 for all k ∈ {m, . . . , n0}. Since there are m units
of the good, there is i0 ∈ {n0 + 1, . . . , n}\{i} such that xi0(bvi,bvj, v−{i,k}) = 1. By i0 > n0,
vi0 < vm. Thus, we can apply Conclusion (iv) of Claim again. Apply Conclusion (iv) of
Claim (n − n0) times in this way. As a result, we have: xk(bvN1 ,bvN4, vN\(N1∪N4)) = 0 for
all k ∈ N1 ∪ N3 ∪ N4, where N1 ⊆ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, #N1 = n − n0, N3 = {m, . . . , n0},
N4 = {n0 + 1, . . . , n}, bvN1 = (vm, . . . , vm), and bvN4 = (vm, . . . , vm). The number of agents
who receive the good at the preference profile (bvN1,bvN4, vN\(N1∪N4)) is less than or equal
to n − [(n − n0) + (n0 −m + 1) + (n − n0)] = (m − 1) − (n − n0). By n > n0, this is a
contradiction.
Case 2-B-2: m − 1 < n − n0. Similarly to Case 2-B-1, apply Conclusion (iv) of
Claim (m − 1) times. As a result, we have: xk(bvN1 ,bvN4 , vN\(N1∪N4)) = 0 for all k ∈
N1 ∪ N3 ∪ N4, where N1 = {1, . . . ,m − 1}, N3 = {m, . . . , n0}, N4 ⊆ {n0 + 1, . . . , n},
#N4 = m−1, bvN1 = (vm, . . . , vm), and bvN4 = (vm, . . . , vm). Since there are m units of the
good, there is k ∈ N\(N1 ∪N3 ∪N4) such that xk(bvN1 ,bvN4, vN\(N1∪N4)) = 1. By k > n0,
vk < vm. Let bvk = vm. Then, by Conclusion (iii) of Claim, for all h ∈ N1 ∪ N3 ∪ N4,
xh(bvN1,bvN4, bvk, vN\(N1∪N4∪{k})) = xk(bvN1 ,bvN4 ,bvk, vN\(N1∪N4∪{k})) = 1. Since there are only
m units of the good, this is a contradiction.
8In case of N4 = {n0 + 1, . . . , n0 +m− 1}, (bvN1 , bvN4 , vN\(N1∪N4)) is the value profile such that
( bv1, . . . , bvm−1| {z }
N1
, vm, . . . , vn0| {z },
N3
bvn0+1, . . . , bvn0+m−1| {z }
N4
, vn0+m, . . . , vn)
= (vm, . . . , vm| {z }
N1
, vm, . . . , vm| {z }
N3
, vm, . . . , vm| {z }
N4
, vn0+m, . . . , vn).
8
Since we get a contradiction whether m − 1 ≥ n − n0 or m − 1 < n − n0, Condition
(B) holds.
Since Conditions (A) and (B) both hold, f(v) is efficient. We have completed the
proof of Proposition.
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